Ivory Coast is also at a preliminary stage in obtaining debt relief through the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) initiative. However, the lack of political stability and accusations of poor financial governance mean that debt relief, too, has become another casualty of the Ivorian civil war. The news is not all bleak. Despite the crisis, the Ivorian economy grew by 1.8% in 2005. With petrol, telecommunications and cocoa all performing better than expected, there is hope of an economic revival. But Ivory Coast's economy is caught in the same stalemate as every other sector of public life. Until the political crisis is resolved, investors will shy away, the international financial institutions will be cautious, and the economy will never take off properly. The debt relief that could so help Ivory Coast, and its suffering millions, will also remain tantalisingly out of reach.
2. A peace accord was recently reached in the Ivory Coast to end the Civil War, but lasting stability depends on successful elections
UNITED NATIONS (Reuters) - The U.N. Security Council voted on Monday to extend the mandate of a peacekeeping force in Ivory Coast until January to help create peaceful conditions for elections that have been repeatedly delayed. Ivory Coast's fragile peace process was dented by an attack on Prime Minister Guillaume Soro last month that raised tensions as authorities prepare for elections early in 2008. Soro, leader of the New Forces rebels, was made prime minister in April under a deal to reunite the West African country, split in two since the rebels seized its northern half during a brief 2002-03 civil war. The Security Council resolution adopted by a 15-0 vote extended the mandate of U.N. forces and French forces until January 15 "in order to support the organization in Cote d'Ivoire of free, open, fair and transparent elections." The former French colony's peace process was revived in March, when Soro and former rival President Laurent Gbagbo pledged to reunite the country and hold elections. Arch-enemies since the war ended, Gbagbo and Soro became allies in the home-grown peace plan that replaced a litany of failed foreign-imposed deals. While the deal raised the hopes of war-weary Ivorians, there is concern at the lack of progress in preparing elections in the Ivory Coast, the world's top cocoa producer. U.N. efforts to hold elections to seal a lasting peace and reunification have missed a string of deadlines since 2005. Monday's resolution approved a change in the role of the peacekeeping force in line with the March peace agreement. The United Nations will end the post of its High Representative for Elections in Ivory Coast, Gerard Stoudman. The task of helping organize elections will now be carried out by a team attached to the Secretary General's Special Representative in Ivory Coast. Gbagbo, who is expected to stand for re-election, has said he asked the United Nations to remove both Stoudman and the former special representative because he said they were behaving "as if they had power to govern Ivory Coast."
B. Link – Aid props up corrupt regimes. The government will no longer feel pressure for reform
Carol Lancaster. Previous deputy administrator at the US Agency for International Development. Assistant Professor at the Georgetown University School of Foreign Service. 1999. “Aid Effectiveness in Africa” Journal of African Economies. Vol. 8 No. 4 http://web.nps.navy.mil/~relooney/3041_222.pdf
The symbolic approbation inherent in a gift of aid can have a perverse effect on development where that aid is provided to corrupt, repressive or incompetent governments. It can strengthen their legitimacy, encourage their poor governance and prolong the duration of their regime. It is no accident that the four largest recipients of US aid in Africa between 1957 and 1995 – Zaire, Liberia, Somalia and Sudan – are among the worse development performers in the world, in no small measure an unintended consequence of US aid (which was provided in any case primarily for reasons other than promoting development). The conclusion of this discussion on aid effectiveness in Africa is that aid is a double-edged sword. Where the economic and political environment is right, it can be very helpful in supporting economic and social progress in recipient countries. Where that environment is poor, it will likely have no positive effect and be wasted at best. At worst, it can set development back through the potential negative economic and political impacts it can have.
C. Gbagbo, the current Ivory Coast president, will use this power to destabilize the country. He wants to stay in power
Adrien Feniou. Writer for Global Insight. 7/17/06. “CA'te d'Ivoire President Sends Warning to UN” Lexis.
Gbagbo is in a delicate political situation. To remedy this state of affairs he has been shrewdly manipulating the presidential tribune with two aims in mind. Firstly, knowing that elections are unlikely within the agreed-upon framework, Gbagbo is galvanising his most fervent supporters to use their destabilising capacity against an increasingly threatening UN.Secondly, the president has been reaffirming the primacy of his constitutional mandate over the UN's demands. In reminding the UNOCI that it entered C te d'Ivoire with the acquiescence of the Ivorian authorities, Gbagbo is attempting to provide a framework of legitimacy for his retention of power when an election-free October passes by.
Further disruption will ruin the peace process and plunge the country into chaos
Joe Bavier. Writer for US Fed News. 10/25/06. “VOA News: After Four Years of Mediation, Ivory Coast Peace Elusive”
The new U.N. resolution would extend President Gbagbo's mandate another 12 months. The extension will be his second, and U.N. Secretary-General Koffi Annan has already said it will be his last. "The African leaders, they are concerned, especially the neighbors of Cote d'Ivoire. So they are serious, and they will demand discipline this time," said Pierre Schori, who is Mr. Annan's special representative in Ivory Coast. But as the Security Council vote approaches, political positions in Ivory Coast have hardened. President Gbagbo and his supporters have warned against a U.N. decision that might undermine the country's constitution. Meanwhile, the New Forces rebels and major political opposition parties are calling for the constitution to be suspended entirely. They have refused to budge from their position that a second extension of Mr. Gbagbo's mandate should not be an option, and that the prime minister should take over all power November 1st. Kandia Camera is deputy secretary-general of the RDR, one of the two main opposition parties. "You see. That is the problem. In this country's crisis, we should only have one leader, not two leaders," he said. "Above all, if the two leaders cannot work together because they do not have the same aim." The mounting rhetoric on all sides has many people\ worried that violence is imminent, no matter what the United Nations decides. The ICG's Yabi says that kind of underlying tension should serve as a reminder to the international community that, despite an end to open fighting, Ivory Coast's conflict is far from over. "It is clear that society in Ivory Coast is still polarized along political and ethnic lines, and that small events can provoke a massive return to violence in the country," he said. "So it is really time now to be very strict and very strong in the resolution of the crisis."
D. Impact - Under Gbagbo ethnic tensions and human rights violations will increase while instability spreads throughout Western Africa. This will create a foothold for Al Qaeda.
Douglas Farah. Writer for the Washington Post. 11/22/04. “Ivory Coast’s president divided his country” http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A3155-2004Nov21.html The decision last Monday by the U.N. Security Council to impose an arms embargo on Ivory Coast -- with the possibility of further sanctions -- was necessary to slow the spiral toward chaos in what once was West Africa's oasis of stability and relative prosperity. The simmering conflict in Ivory Coast threatens the region, already buffeted by brutal war and crises. It is also a broader security concern because terrorist organizations, including al Qaeda and Hezbollah, have established sanctuaries in West Africa. More unrest will offer them new opportunities to become entrenched. To understand events in Ivory Coast, the world's largest cocoa producer, one must understand the destructive role played by the nation's president, Laurent Gbagbo, and his xenophobic inner circle. In late November 2000, the newly elected Gbagbo met privately with the ambassadors of France, the United States and Britain. With his country teetering on the edge of civil war, Gbagbo agreed to allow the main opposition party, excluded from the presidential contest and made up mostly of Muslims from the north, to participate in scheduled parliamentary elections. Gbagbo had narrowly defeated a despised military officer in violence-marred elections in which less than 30 percent of the eligible voters cast ballots. His openly anti-Muslim campaign rhetoric and promises to purge Ivory Coast of foreigners were largely lost in the chaos of the moment. Gbagbo promised to announce the agreement in a televised address to the nation. But a cabinet minister appeared instead to announce that the opposition was banned and also to challenge the right of its members to citizenship. It was the first step in Gbagbo's effort to undo four decades of policies that had successfully encouraged racial and religious harmony. The ambassadors were stunned by Gbagbo's duplicity. But it was only the first of many deceptions that have led to Ivory Coast's near-pariah status. I was in Abidjan the next day when angry Muslims took to the streets to protest, only to be met by armed, government-sponsored mobs that rampaged through Muslim sectors of the city. They systematically attacked immigrants from Burkina Faso, Mali and other impoverished countries who had been invited into Ivory Coast as laborers. Human Rights Watch documented the atrocities of Gbagbo's forces, including massacres of unarmed youths buried in common graves, rape, torture and the razing of mosques. The Muslim staff members of The Post's bureau were threatened and their houses ransacked while the police looked on. They joined tens of thousands of others who fled to neighboring countries. The vigilantes, with Gbagbo's encouragement, attacked the French, the former colonial masters, who maintained strong economic ties there. As the situation deteriorated, Gbagbo spent scarce resources to purchase helicopter gunships and the Ukrainian crews to fly them -- a deal he repeatedly denied making. Even so, the French took the lead in stationing several hundred peacekeepers in Ivory Coast after last year's brief civil war, separating rebel forces in the north from Gbagbo's troops in the south. They helped negotiate a cease-fire and start peace talks. When Gbagbo's forces violated the cease-fire this month and used the helicopters to attack peacekeeping positions, killing nine French soldiers and an American aid worker, the response was swift. The French launched a lightning strike, destroying the Ivorian air force, including the gunships. The move may have smacked of colonial hubris, but it did not come in a vacuum. Gbagbo's past record caught up with him. Even other African nations are unwilling to listen to his explanations this time. In response, Gbagbo did what he has done repeatedly: unleashed armed, government-sanctioned thugs to loot, pillage and terrorize. When the African Union called an emergency meeting to discuss the situation, Gbagbo skipped the event. Instead, he stayed home and named as head of the armed forces the very commander whose forces launched the attack on the peacekeepers. In an interview with The Post, Gbagbo questioned whether French troops had really died. The tragedy for Ivory Coast is that the damage to the fabric of society, as well as to the economy, will be almost impossible to reverse. The businessmen fleeing the country provided thousands of jobs that are unlikely to return. Foreign investment has shriveled while unemployment has skyrocketed. The remittances sent by the immigrant workers to their homelands sustained hundreds of thousands of families. Muslims and Christians, northerners and southerners are separated by anger and fear. The rebels who control the northern half of the country are not the solution. They are an unsavory mix of disgruntled Ivorian officers, remnants of Charles Taylor's thuggish security forces and other guns-for-hire from around the region. Criminal networks trafficking in weapons and diamonds span the border area of Ivory Coast, Liberia and Guinea, creating what one senior Pentagon official called a "fluid mass of anarchy." But the rebels gained a foothold because of Gbagbo's single-minded determination to split his country along ethnic and religious lines while entrenching himself in power. The unanimous and swift U.N. action may give Gbagbo pause. The arms embargo, coupled with the threat of travel restrictions and economic penalties on those who continue to fan the violence, offers a chance to keep the crisis manageable as the international community, led by the African Union, seeks a solution. Gbagbo will undoubtedly make new promises to escape the sanctions. The United Nations should respond according to his actions, not his words.
A. Uniqueness
1. The Ivory Coast isn’t receiving aid now because of instability & corruption
BBC. 6/20/06. “Ivory Coast faces worst economic crisis” http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/business/5097634.stmIvory Coast is also at a preliminary stage in obtaining debt relief through the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) initiative. However, the lack of political stability and accusations of poor financial governance mean that debt relief, too, has become another casualty of the Ivorian civil war. The news is not all bleak. Despite the crisis, the Ivorian economy grew by 1.8% in 2005. With petrol, telecommunications and cocoa all performing better than expected, there is hope of an economic revival. But Ivory Coast's economy is caught in the same stalemate as every other sector of public life. Until the political crisis is resolved, investors will shy away, the international financial institutions will be cautious, and the economy will never take off properly. The debt relief that could so help Ivory Coast, and its suffering millions, will also remain tantalisingly out of reach.
2. A peace accord was recently reached in the Ivory Coast to end the Civil War, but lasting stability depends on successful elections
Claudia Parsons. Reuters. 7/16/07. “U.N. extends peacekeeping mandate for Ivory Coast” http://www.canada.com/topics/news/world/story.html?id=152c1c1e-6086-4269-85d6-c448fb472f50&k=16339
UNITED NATIONS (Reuters) - The U.N. Security Council voted on Monday to extend the mandate of a peacekeeping force in Ivory Coast until January to help create peaceful conditions for elections that have been repeatedly delayed. Ivory Coast's fragile peace process was dented by an attack on Prime Minister Guillaume Soro last month that raised tensions as authorities prepare for elections early in 2008. Soro, leader of the New Forces rebels, was made prime minister in April under a deal to reunite the West African country, split in two since the rebels seized its northern half during a brief 2002-03 civil war. The Security Council resolution adopted by a 15-0 vote extended the mandate of U.N. forces and French forces until January 15 "in order to support the organization in Cote d'Ivoire of free, open, fair and transparent elections." The former French colony's peace process was revived in March, when Soro and former rival President Laurent Gbagbo pledged to reunite the country and hold elections. Arch-enemies since the war ended, Gbagbo and Soro became allies in the home-grown peace plan that replaced a litany of failed foreign-imposed deals. While the deal raised the hopes of war-weary Ivorians, there is concern at the lack of progress in preparing elections in the Ivory Coast, the world's top cocoa producer. U.N. efforts to hold elections to seal a lasting peace and reunification have missed a string of deadlines since 2005. Monday's resolution approved a change in the role of the peacekeeping force in line with the March peace agreement. The United Nations will end the post of its High Representative for Elections in Ivory Coast, Gerard Stoudman. The task of helping organize elections will now be carried out by a team attached to the Secretary General's Special Representative in Ivory Coast. Gbagbo, who is expected to stand for re-election, has said he asked the United Nations to remove both Stoudman and the former special representative because he said they were behaving "as if they had power to govern Ivory Coast."B. Link – Aid props up corrupt regimes. The government will no longer feel pressure for reform
Carol Lancaster. Previous deputy administrator at the US Agency for International Development. Assistant Professor at the Georgetown University School of Foreign Service. 1999. “Aid Effectiveness in Africa” Journal of African Economies. Vol. 8 No. 4 http://web.nps.navy.mil/~relooney/3041_222.pdfThe symbolic approbation inherent in a gift of aid can have a perverse effect on development where that aid is provided to corrupt, repressive or incompetent governments. It can strengthen their legitimacy, encourage their poor governance and prolong the duration of their regime. It is no accident that the four largest recipients of US aid in Africa between 1957 and 1995 – Zaire, Liberia, Somalia and Sudan – are among the worse development performers in the world, in no small measure an unintended consequence of US aid (which was provided in any case primarily for reasons other than promoting development). The conclusion of this discussion on aid effectiveness in Africa is that aid is a double-edged sword. Where the economic and political environment is right, it can be very helpful in supporting economic and social progress in recipient countries. Where that environment is poor, it will likely have no positive effect and be wasted at best. At worst, it can set development back through the potential negative economic and political impacts it can have.
C. Gbagbo, the current Ivory Coast president, will use this power to destabilize the country. He wants to stay in power
Adrien Feniou. Writer for Global Insight. 7/17/06. “CA'te d'Ivoire President Sends Warning to UN” Lexis.Gbagbo is in a delicate political situation. To remedy this state of affairs he has been shrewdly manipulating the presidential tribune with two aims in mind. Firstly, knowing that elections are unlikely within the agreed-upon framework, Gbagbo is galvanising his most fervent supporters to use their destabilising capacity against an increasingly threatening UN. Secondly, the president has been reaffirming the primacy of his constitutional mandate over the UN's demands. In reminding the UNOCI that it entered C te d'Ivoire with the acquiescence of the Ivorian authorities, Gbagbo is attempting to provide a framework of legitimacy for his retention of power when an election-free October passes by.
Further disruption will ruin the peace process and plunge the country into chaos
Joe Bavier. Writer for US Fed News. 10/25/06. “VOA News: After Four Years of Mediation, Ivory Coast Peace Elusive”The new U.N. resolution would extend President Gbagbo's mandate another 12 months. The extension will be his second, and U.N. Secretary-General Koffi Annan has already said it will be his last. "The African leaders, they are concerned, especially the neighbors of Cote d'Ivoire. So they are serious, and they will demand discipline this time," said Pierre Schori, who is Mr. Annan's special representative in Ivory Coast. But as the Security Council vote approaches, political positions in Ivory Coast have hardened. President Gbagbo and his supporters have warned against a U.N. decision that might undermine the country's constitution. Meanwhile, the New Forces rebels and major political opposition parties are calling for the constitution to be suspended entirely. They have refused to budge from their position that a second extension of Mr. Gbagbo's mandate should not be an option, and that the prime minister should take over all power November 1st. Kandia Camera is deputy secretary-general of the RDR, one of the two main opposition parties. "You see. That is the problem. In this country's crisis, we should only have one leader, not two leaders," he said. "Above all, if the two leaders cannot work together because they do not have the same aim." The mounting rhetoric on all sides has many people\ worried that violence is imminent, no matter what the United Nations decides. The ICG's Yabi says that kind of underlying tension should serve as a reminder to the international community that, despite an end to open fighting, Ivory Coast's conflict is far from over. "It is clear that society in Ivory Coast is still polarized along political and ethnic lines, and that small events can provoke a massive return to violence in the country," he said. "So it is really time now to be very strict and very strong in the resolution of the crisis."
D. Impact - Under Gbagbo ethnic tensions and human rights violations will increase while instability spreads throughout Western Africa. This will create a foothold for Al Qaeda.
Douglas Farah. Writer for the Washington Post. 11/22/04. “Ivory Coast’s president divided his country” http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A3155-2004Nov21.htmlThe decision last Monday by the U.N. Security Council to impose an arms embargo on Ivory Coast -- with the possibility of further sanctions -- was necessary to slow the spiral toward chaos in what once was West Africa's oasis of stability and relative prosperity. The simmering conflict in Ivory Coast threatens the region, already buffeted by brutal war and crises. It is also a broader security concern because terrorist organizations, including al Qaeda and Hezbollah, have established sanctuaries in West Africa. More unrest will offer them new opportunities to become entrenched.
To understand events in Ivory Coast, the world's largest cocoa producer, one must understand the destructive role played by the nation's president, Laurent Gbagbo, and his xenophobic inner circle. In late November 2000, the newly elected Gbagbo met privately with the ambassadors of France, the United States and Britain. With his country teetering on the edge of civil war, Gbagbo agreed to allow the main opposition party, excluded from the presidential contest and made up mostly of Muslims from the north, to participate in scheduled parliamentary elections. Gbagbo had narrowly defeated a despised military officer in violence-marred elections in which less than 30 percent of the eligible voters cast ballots. His openly anti-Muslim campaign rhetoric and promises to purge Ivory Coast of foreigners were largely lost in the chaos of the moment. Gbagbo promised to announce the agreement in a televised address to the nation. But a cabinet minister appeared instead to announce that the opposition was banned and also to challenge the right of its members to citizenship. It was the first step in Gbagbo's effort to undo four decades of policies that had successfully encouraged racial and religious harmony. The ambassadors were stunned by Gbagbo's duplicity. But it was only the first of many deceptions that have led to Ivory Coast's near-pariah status. I was in Abidjan the next day when angry Muslims took to the streets to protest, only to be met by armed, government-sponsored mobs that rampaged through Muslim sectors of the city. They systematically attacked immigrants from Burkina Faso, Mali and other impoverished countries who had been invited into Ivory Coast as laborers. Human Rights Watch documented the atrocities of Gbagbo's forces, including massacres of unarmed youths buried in common graves, rape, torture and the razing of mosques. The Muslim staff members of The Post's bureau were threatened and their houses ransacked while the police looked on. They joined tens of thousands of others who fled to neighboring countries. The vigilantes, with Gbagbo's encouragement, attacked the French, the former colonial masters, who maintained strong economic ties there. As the situation deteriorated, Gbagbo spent scarce resources to purchase helicopter gunships and the Ukrainian crews to fly them -- a deal he repeatedly denied making. Even so, the French took the lead in stationing several hundred peacekeepers in Ivory Coast after last year's brief civil war, separating rebel forces in the north from Gbagbo's troops in the south. They helped negotiate a cease-fire and start peace talks. When Gbagbo's forces violated the cease-fire this month and used the helicopters to attack peacekeeping positions, killing nine French soldiers and an American aid worker, the response was swift. The French launched a lightning strike, destroying the Ivorian air force, including the gunships. The move may have smacked of colonial hubris, but it did not come in a vacuum. Gbagbo's past record caught up with him. Even other African nations are unwilling to listen to his explanations this time. In response, Gbagbo did what he has done repeatedly: unleashed armed, government-sanctioned thugs to loot, pillage and terrorize. When the African Union called an emergency meeting to discuss the situation, Gbagbo skipped the event. Instead, he stayed home and named as head of the armed forces the very commander whose forces launched the attack on the peacekeepers. In an interview with The Post, Gbagbo questioned whether French troops had really died. The tragedy for Ivory Coast is that the damage to the fabric of society, as well as to the economy, will be almost impossible to reverse. The businessmen fleeing the country provided thousands of jobs that are unlikely to return. Foreign investment has shriveled while unemployment has skyrocketed. The remittances sent by the immigrant workers to their homelands sustained hundreds of thousands of families. Muslims and Christians, northerners and southerners are separated by anger and fear. The rebels who control the northern half of the country are not the solution. They are an unsavory mix of disgruntled Ivorian officers, remnants of Charles Taylor's thuggish security forces and other guns-for-hire from around the region. Criminal networks trafficking in weapons and diamonds span the border area of Ivory Coast, Liberia and Guinea, creating what one senior Pentagon official called a "fluid mass of anarchy." But the rebels gained a foothold because of Gbagbo's single-minded determination to split his country along ethnic and religious lines while entrenching himself in power. The unanimous and swift U.N. action may give Gbagbo pause. The arms embargo, coupled with the threat of travel restrictions and economic penalties on those who continue to fan the violence, offers a chance to keep the crisis manageable as the international community, led by the African Union, seeks a solution. Gbagbo will undoubtedly make new promises to escape the sanctions. The United Nations should respond according to his actions, not his words.